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"The power ofspeech has the same effect on the condition ofthe soul as the
application of drugs to the state of bodies, for just as different drugs dispel
different fluids from the body, and some bring an end to disease but others
end life, so also some speeches cause pain, some pleasure, some fear; some
instill courage, some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persua
sion."'
Gorgias (483- 375 BC)
INTRODUCTION

It has long been in vogue to discredit the judiciary. 2 From the early

days of legal realism, the concept of the "impartial" judge has been repeat1. READINGS FROM CLASSICAL RHETORIC, 34, 35 (Patricia P. Matsen, Philip Rollin
son & Marion Sousa eds., 1990) (quoting the Greek philosopher Gorgias ).
2. See, e.g., Alex B. Long, "Stop Me Before I Vote for This Judge Again": Judicial
Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining ofElected Judges, 106
W.VA. L. REv. I, 48 (2003). Long argues that judicial independence and accountability is a
modern reaction against judicial misconduct, which is made even more obscene by the poor
ly written judicial opinions against judges accused of judicial misconduct. This distrust can
be traced as far back as colonial American times given that "the framers of the United States
Constitution provided for only one explicit method of disciplining federal judges
impeachment." /d. at 17; see also Martin H. Redish, Taking a Stroll Through Jurassic Park:
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edly scoffed at by those initiated in modern theories of jurisprudence. 3 Ever
more convincing studies into the pervasive nature of cognitive biases,4
among other disheartening studies, have further eroded our faith in the abil
ity of human nature to transcend itself to faithfully mete out that most elu
sive of concepts-justice. 5
Yet, the judiciary remains the most trusted of the three branches of
govemment. 6 Though imperfect, the public does generally trust and respect
the judiciary. 7 And, if we are honest with ourselves, so do the majority of
Americans (lawyers and even academics) because judges are perceived as

Neutral Principles and the Originalist-Minimalist Fallacy in Constitutional Interpretation,
88 Nw. U. L. REV. 165, 165-66 ( 1993) (The basic premise of the article is that judicial consti
tutional interpretation is the first line of defense against the "unrepresentative judicial 'phi
losopher-kings,' [which] surely threatens the values of self-determination, accountability and
representationalism that provide core notions of American political theory.").
3. Scott B. Gitterman, Taking on Big Money: How Caperton Will Change Judicial
Disqualification Forever, 35 NOVA L. REV. 475, 498 (2011); Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Pro
cess and Judicial Disqualification: The Needfor Reform, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1143 (2011)
("The fifth and most important tenet, judge impartiality, is not consistent with the self
judging of recusal motions, which is the law in most states and the federal system, and find
ing an impartial appellate judge for an interlocutory appeal places a heavy burden on liti
gants. In fact, it is so ingrained in our judiciary that the challenged judge should pass upon a
recusal motion that Chief Justice Rehnquist rebuked Senators Patrick Leahy and Joe Lieber
man for questioning Justice Scalia in Cheney while the case was pending."); see Republican
Party ofMinn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) ("There is a critical difference between the
work of the judge and the work of other public officials. In a democracy, issues of policy are
properly decided by majority vote; it is the business of legislators and executives to be popu
lar. But in litigation, issues of law or fact should not be determined by popular vote; it is the
business ofjudges to be indifferent to unpopularity.").
4. Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who's Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94
MINN. L. REv. 1997,2005 (2010) (describing judges' "paradigmatic status," which has been
understood to require "the separation of legal reason from emotion"); Dan Simon, A Psycho
logical Model ofJudicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. I, 39-41 (1998).
5. Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 629, 630 (2011) (defining "judicial dispassion" synonymously with "emotion
less judging").
6. Adam Liptak, Sunday Dialogue: Putting the Justices on TV, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
10, 20 II, http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/12/11 /opinion/sunday/sunday-dialogue-putting-the
justices-on-tv.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all?src=tp; see THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton) (It is the judiciary's duty "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the
Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would
amount to nothing." Hamilton warned that courts exercising executive or legislative powers
would amount to judicial tyranny; but he believed that only the judiciary could be trusted to
hold the other branches to the prescribed limits of their authority.).
7. Liptak, supra note 6; Nancy S. Marder, Letter to the Editor, Invitation to a DiaN.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
6,
2011,
logue:
Cameras
in
the
Court?,
http://www.nytimes.com/20 II /12/07 /opinionlinvitation-to-a-dialogue-cameras-in-the
supreme-court.html ?scp= I &sq=cameras%20in%20the%20court&st=cse.
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the least corrupt product of our political system. 8 Held to the standards of
Judicial Codes of Conduct, 9 sheathed in the mystery of the law, by dint of
their education, experience, age, and public reputation, the judiciary has
remained mostly removed from the scorn of the public and generally untar
nished from the dirt and mudslinging of the public square.
It still takes some guts to impugn the integrity of a judge. Or, at least,
it used to. Since Bush v. Gore, 10 however, even the Supreme Court has in
creasingly been subject to the new accepted truth of the political judge. 11 It
no longer even raises eyebrows to refer to the "conservative" or the "liber
al" Justices in the prediction of judicial decisions. 12 Those predictions are
presumptively based on the political ideology of the judge, and not on some
accepted version of truth or even simply deferral to ideals of the law some
where beyond partisanship.
Recently, however, even that subjective ideological characterization is
increasingly turning into a darker and greatly more troubling conceptualiza
tion. The new sense is that judges, particularly those coming out of the judi
cial election process, are bought and paid for. 13 If not with direct bribes,
8. Americans Trust Judiciary Branch Most, Legislative Least, GALLUP POLITICS
(Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/video/122894/Americans-Trust-Judicial-Branch
Legislative-Least.aspx ("More than three in four Americans (76%) say they have a great deal
or fair amount of trust and confidence in the government's judicial branch, compared with
61% who trust the executive branch and 45% who trust the legislative branch."); see also
Frank Newport, Trust in Legislative Branch Falls to Record-Low 36%, GALLUP POLITICS
(Sept. 24, 20 I 0), http://www.gallup.com/poll/143225/Trust-Legislative-Branch-Falls
Record-Low.aspx; Maroney, supra note 5, at 636.
9. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2010).
10. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn
Judicial Integrity in Court Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363,364-65 (2010) ("The scholarly
literature generally supports the denial of First Amendment protection in such cases, indicat
ing that attorney speech-when made in court proceedings-is entitled to little, if any, con
stitutional protection. Indeed, in its 1991 plurality opinion, Gentile v. State Bar ofNevada, a
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court stated in dicta: 'It is unquestionable that in the court
room itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right to "free speech" an attorney has is
extremely circumscribed."').
11. See Stephanie Condon, Elena Kagan: Four Potential Corifirmation Hurdles,
CBS NEWS (May 10, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20004539503544.html; Dylan Loewe, The Politics of Sotomayor, HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dylan-loewe/the-politics-of-sotomayor_b_ 207617 .html
("Will nominating the first Hispanic justice to the high court further Obama's courtship of
the Hispanic community? It certainly can't hurt, though it's hard to imagine that it alone will
do the job. But Obama may stand to gain more, not from corralling a majority of Democrats
to vote in favor of Sotomayor, but from inspiring the most virulent elements of the Republi
can Party to oppose her.").
12. See Supreme Court, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/Supreme
Court.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
13. ADAM SKAGGS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BUYING JUSTICE: THE IMPACT OF
CITIZENS
UNITED
ON
JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS,
4-7
(2010),
available
at
http://www. brennancenter.org/page/-/publications/BCReportBuyingJustice. pdf?nocdn= l
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judicial decisions are bought through the corrosive process of political cam
paign donations. 14 Justice is for sale.
Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that judicial campaign do
nations do appear to affect judicial decision making. 15 Results are apparently
exacerbated by contentious political judicial races. 16 Moreover, there is clear
evidence that the public perception of the corrosive effects of campaign
contributions is endemic. 17 And that was before Citizens United. 18
For the judiciary, the reality of a Citizens United worldview of cam
paign speech and the regulation of the judiciary has only begun to be felt or
really examined in the context of the judicial election paradigm. 19 It creates
the reality of a fundamental clash of principles-the "guiding principle" of
freedom, the primacy of the unfettered exchange of ideas-with the "guid
ing principle" of justice, the idea of blind Lady Justice herself, embodied in

[hereinafter BUYING JUSTICE] (collecting survey data on national and state level data demon
strating that Americans believe, by significant margins, that campaign spending has an im
pact on judicial decision-making).
14. ADAM SKAGGS ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS: 2009-10, 2022 (2011), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/23b60118bc49d599bd_35m6yyon3.pdf [here
inafter NEW POLITICS].
15. Solid Bipartisan Majorities Believe Judges Influenced by Campaign Contribu
JUSTICE
AT
STAKE
CAMPAIGN
(Sept.
8,
201 0),
tions,
http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroorn/press_releases.cfm/981 0_solid_bipartisan_majoritie
s_believe judges_influenced_by_campaign_contributions?show=news&newsiD=8722
(among the findings of the survey were the following: "71 percent of Democrats, and 70
percent of Republicans, believe campaign expenditures have a significant impact on court
room decisions." Only 23 percent of all voters "believe campaign expenditures have little or
no influence on elected judges." Moreover, "82 percent of Republicans, and 79 percent of
Democrats, say a judge should not hear cases involving a campaign supporter who spent
$10,000 toward his or her election." Finally, "88 percent of Republicans, and 86 percent of
Democrats, say that 'all campaign expenditures to elect judges' should be publicly disclosed,
so that voters can know who is seeking to elect each candidate.").
16. /d.
17. /d.
18. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); CHRISTIAN W.
PECK, ZOGBY lNT'L, ATTITUDES AND VIEWS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS ON STATE
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO JUDGES 3 (2007), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/CED_FINAL_repor_ ons_14MA Y07_BED4DF495
5BOI.pdf ("Four in five business leaders worry that financial contributions have a major
influence on decisions rendered by judges. There is near-universal concern among business
leaders that 'Campaign contributions and political pressure will make judges accountable to
politicians and special interest groups instead of the law and the Constitution.'").
19. See generally Michael C. Dorf, The Constitution and the Political Community,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 499 (2011). See also Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutional Hypocrisy,
27 CONST. COMMENT. 557, 571-72 (20 11) ("Judicial review can rationalize the practice of
illegitimate discrimination by making the culture's oppressive behavior seem as if it flows
rationally from the equality principle embodied in the Constitution. This, in turn, provides an
excuse for engaging in cultural practices that would otherwise seem unconstitutionally invid
ious.").
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the fragile transcendent concept of the rule of law beyond faction or group.
Such tension always existed in the defining of the appropriate role of judi
cial selection, but never before has the Supreme Court pushed freedom of
speech so far forward and combined it with the freedom to advertise, to
sway opinion, and to campaign on behalf of the heretofore mostly silent
judge. 20 We are left with the very real question of whether what's left of
society's belief in the law will be subsumed into a sea of never ending, well
funded, and vicious chatter.
This Article will look at the idea of judicial elections and ask the fun
damental question: Is it possible to maintain an impartial judiciary in the
wake of Citizens United? In Part I, it will argue that the system as it current
ly exists and the remedies currently available make little sense in the brave
new world we now live in. In Part II, it will argue that there are only two
legitimate societal choices available, accept the entrance of a pervasive,
increasingly powerful influence on judges and its corollary of ever decreas
ing faith of the public in judges, or end judicial elections entirely. The Su
preme Court was quite correct when it said, "campaigning for office is not a
game." 21 It is deadly serious and, I will argue, inherently incompatible with
the universality required in the belief of the rule oflaw and not men.
I. ELECTIONS HAVE CONSEQUENCES

"I have always thought, from my earliest youth till now, that the greatest
scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning
people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent Judiciary. •>22
John Marshall (1830)
Proceedings and Debates ofthe
Virginia State Convention of 1829-1830
A. The Majoritarian Dilemma
There is attraction to the idea of accountability-that the judge must
be and should be held up to the majoritarian view and that such majoritarian
views can best be discerned by the people's choice of candidates among
20. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (2010) ("No sufficient governmental interest
justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.").
21. Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806,
2826 (2011) ('"Leveling the playing field' can sound like a good thing. But in a democracy,
campaigning for office is not a game. It is a critically important form of speech. The First
Amendment embodies our choice as a Nation that, when it comes to such speech, the guiding
principle is freedom-the 'unfettered interchange of ideas'-not whatever the State may
view as fair." (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976))).
22. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 251 (1920) overruled by United States v. Hatter,
532 U.S. 557 (2001), citing Debates Va. Conv. 1829-1831, pp. 616,619.
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those on the ballot. 23 After all, we are all subject to the law. Hence, the legal
arbiter, the judge, should be subject to us-by ballot. There is comfort in the
idea that the people can express their anger at judicial excess by vote, de
mocracy at work.
The tradition of empowering the people through electoral rights has a
storied history in the United States. 24 By the mid-nineteenth century, judicial
elections had become popular as part of the Jacksonian movement toward
greater control of public office. 25 Though the Federalists, embodied by
Hamilton, had prevailed in having judicial merit appointment be the sole
selection process for the Federal bench, the Anti-Federalists had persevered
in the state arena. 26 Their concern was that of accountabilityY An independ
ent judge could "feel themselves independent of heaven itself."28 Thus, the
appeal of the judicial election is that it keeps the judge firmly in tune with
the constituency responsible for the selection.
From its outset, this majoritarian ideal was acknowledged to be in con
flict with the equally long-standing common law tradition of judicial inde
pendence.29 To arrive at a workable median, the judicial election process
was bound by-rules significantly more restrictive than those of its legislative
or executive counterparts. 30 As judicial elections have become more politi
cized, however, the majoritarian paradigm may be understood to be suc
cumbing to partisan faction. As Justice O'Connor identified, '"In too many
states, judicial elections are becoming political prizefights where partisans
and special interests seek to install judges who will answer to them instead
of the law and the Constitution. "'31
The majoritarian ideal itself is fraught with certain dangers not present
in executive or legislative elections. First, this ideal of judicial accountabil
ity by election is arguably better understood as a sense of effective popular23. Judicial elections remain incredibly popular, given that around eighty percent of
judicial positions are fulfilled via an election. Charlie Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence in
the Courts in an Age of Individual Rights and Public Skepticism, in BENCH PRESS: THE
COLLISION OF COURT, POLITICS, AND THE MEDIA 43 (Keith Bybee ed., 2007).
24. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 706-710, 716 (1995); see Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 791 (2002).
25. Terri Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Man
datory Recusal and Due Process, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 359, 363 (2009); Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 791(2002).
26. Day, supra note 25, at 364-65.
27. !d.
28. /d. at 364.
29. /d. at 365.
30. !d. at 363.
CTR.
FOR
JUSTICE
(May
17,
2007)
31. BRENNAN
http://www. brennancenter.org/content/resource/report_shows_spread_of_special_interest_pr
essure_growing_clout_of_business.
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ism than one of actual judicial accountability. The judge, after all, is re
quired to be neutral. The various Codes of Judicial Conduct-both Model
(MR) and enacted-are rife with admonitions requiring impartiality. 32 Some
examples include MR 2.4(a), "A judge shall not be swayed by public clam
or or fear of criticism," and MR 2.3(a), "A judge shall perform the duties of
judicial office ... without bias or prejudice."33
Similarly, a judge's failure to conduct herself impartially is the near
universal standard for requiring judicial recusal. 34 For example, MR 2.11(a):
"A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 35 This includes specif
ic admonitions for recusal when, for example, "[t]he judge, while a judge or
a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other than in a court pro
ceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit
the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the pro
ceeding or controversy."36
For these reasons, judges do not and cannot be understood as appro
priately being able to represent a certain political constituency. It is simply
not within the purported role of the judge in his judicial office to act in a
way that is representative of even a majoritarian consensus, if that consen
sus is beyond the requirements of the law. 37 Thus, judicial accountability is
at best properly restricted to inappropriate role behavior in a judge's appli
cation ofthe law. Yet, as stated above, the Codes of Conduct and other reg
ulatory apparatuses of the judiciary already prohibit such behavior. 38 Given
that judicial elections occur primarily at the state court level and predomi
nantly at the trial level of those states, the implication that election is a
proper method of accountability is simply a form of popularist enforcement
of social norms. 39
Even assuming the public is truly capable of understanding the judicial
role, elections have always had a very uncomfortable fit with the idea of
32. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2010). ADMIN. OFF. OF
U.S. CTS., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3 (2011), available at
http://www.uscourts.govNiewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02A
Ch02.pdf.
33. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 2.3(a) & 2.4(a) (201 0).
34. See id. R. 2.11.
35. !d. Canon 2.ll(a).
36. !d. Canon 2.11 (a)(5).
37. See id. Canon 1 ("A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity,
and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropri
ety."); see also id. pmbl. ("[T]he judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of
justice and the rule of law. Inherent in all the Rules contained in this Code are the precepts
that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a
public trust and strive to maintain and enhance confidence in the legal system.").
38. See id. Canon 1.
39. BUYINGJUSTICE,supranote 13,at 11-12.
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judicial selection or retention. 40 Popularism, or even majoritarianism, has
never been consistent with the judicial function, much of which exists in the
application oflaws exists to protect the rights of the inherently unpopular. 41
Majoritarian arguments in favor of judicial elections combined with
the unfettered ability of interested parties to advertise can only enhance the
populist effect of judicial elections. 42 Or, perhaps more perniciously, they
increase the risks that an effective call to populist elements by interested
parties-political or otherwise-will overwhelm the objectivity which ef
fective judicial elections require. Majoritarian arguments for judicial elec
tions in a post Citizens United world force a very high rationality burden on
the public and an even higher burden of judicial probity of the judge subject
to election by such a system.
Effectively, it rests on a very problematic basic assumption that as
elections get louder and noisier and hence more costly, the effect of cam
paign contributions or funded advertising will be subsumed within that of
adherence to the true majoritarian position, if such can even be correctly
perceived by the much put upon political judge. 43 Accountability will be
effectuated by the judge hearing the public and comporting herself in ac
cordance with that expression, within the bounds of her proper role. If that
does not occur, the advertiser can inform the public of such failing and hope
the next judge elected will be more compliant.
There is little evidence to suggest, however, that whoever is funding
informational campaign ads in a judicial election would do so out of any
thing other than their own particular interest. 44 There is no requirement that
such advertisements be for a public educational purpose and, if legislative
electoral ads are any basis for speculation, advertisements in the judicial

40.

See Merit Selection Should Apply to All Superior Court Judges, BRENNAN CTR.
(May 18, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/merit_selection
_should_apply_to_all_superior_courtjudges/; see New Call for Merit Selection of Judges,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/
new_call_for_merit_selection_ofjudges.
41. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) ("Sir Matthew
Hale pointedly described this essential attribute of the judicial office in words which have
retained their integrity for centuries: 'II. That popular or court applause or distaste have no
influence in anything I do, in point of distribution of justice. 12. Not to be solicitous what
men will say or think, so long as I keep myself exactly according to the rule of justice."'
(quoting 2 J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND 208 (1873) (citations omit
ted))).
42. See generally Croley, supra note 24, at 713-28.
43. See id. at 714-15.
44. NEW POLITICS, supra note 14, at 5 ("The money amassed by a few groups under
scores an important reality about the politics of judicial elections .... Presently, a few super
spenders can dominate judicial election funding with an ease unparalleled in campaigns for
other offices. And loopholes in disclosure laws give them numerous options for doing so in
substantial secrecy.").
FOR JUSTICE
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context will be just as particular and reflective of the funder's, not the pub
lic's, interest. There is also not a true countervailing source of advertising to
support the basic idea of neutrality or objectivity. 45 The most basic of public
choice analysis would predict that the rational judicial candidate will seek to
adopt at the margins behaviors most likely to assure her reelection. We are
likely to have a market failure in advertising supporting rational choice and
moderation.
In the wake of Citizens United, the fear in the judicial election context
is not that the judge will fail to hear the expressed opinion of those voting
and not be accountable to them. The fear in the judicial electoral context is
that the principle that "Elections have Consequences"46 will become all too
true.
B. The Influence-Corruption Spectrum
"The abuse ofbuying and selling votes crept in and money began to play an
important part in determining elections. Later on, this process ofcorruption
spread to the law courts and then to the army. Andfinally, the Republic was
subjected to the rule ofemperors. "41
Plutarch (46- 120 AD)
The fact that speech can influence elections and elected officials has
not been lost on Western civilization. It was, after all, the Ancient Greeks
who raised rhetoric to a science and enshrined it in the canon of liberal
arts. 48 Nor, despite many allusions to the contrary, was that power ignored
by the Supreme Court in crafting its decision in Citizens United. The Court
simply found that "[t]he fact that speakers may have influence over or ac
cess to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt."49

45. Id. at 13 ("As in prior years, non-candidate groups played the attack-dog role,
sponsoring a disproportionate number of negative ads while candidates continued to run
predominantly positive, traditionally themed advertisements. Though many of the non
candidate ads were funded by 'tort reform' groups concerned with civil justice issues, the
vast majority of these ads focused on criminal justice themes, often involving misleading
claims that judicial candidates were soft on crime.").
46. Sen. Bernie Sanders, Elections Have Consequences, HUFFINGTON PosT POLITICS
(July 14, 2011, 7:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/elections-have
consequenc_b_ 8993 78.htrnl.
47. Transcript of Justice at Stake: Is Campaign Money Corrupting Our Courts?
(PBS television broadcast Feb. 19. 2010), http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/02192010/
transcript4.html.
48. JANET M. ATWILL, RHETORIC RECLAIMED: ARISTOTLE AND THE LIBERAL ARTS
TRADITION 2-3 (1998).
49. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Cornm'n., 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010} (emphasis
added).
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It is that distinction, the ability to influence a judge or for a speaker's
point to be favored by a judge as somehow distinct from a conclusion that
the judge is corrupted, that is the crux of the difficulty in applying Citizens
United to the judicial election context. 5° After all, a judge is not only re
quired not to be corrupt, but also affirmatively charged with being impartial
and unbiased. 5 1 That seeming dissonance is a source of discomfort for many.
Why is corruption, as opposed to influence or a reduction in impartial
ity, the standard in Citizens Unitecl? Simply because, for the purpose of
campaign-expenditures law, the original constitutional decision of Buckley
v. Valeo made it so. 52 That case involved the validity of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA) restrictions on campaign contributions and
third-party expenditures. 53
It is necessary to begin at Buckley because that Court's holdings set
the frame for the decision of Citizens United and continues to be the refer
ence by which the Court reviews limitations of political speech. 54 The Court
made six findings of continuing significance. First, it held that spending
money on political campaigns, both by direct contribution and through ex
penditures, was a form of "speech."55 Second, it held that the First Amend-

50. Geyh, Preserving Public Confidence, in BENCH PRESS, supra note 23, at 85.
[L ]aw, in order to be a language of dispute management for everyone, appeal[ s] to
those honestly seeking principled and impartial adjudication as well as to those
who merely want to drape themselves in the mantle of principled impartiality. Peo
ple value the ideal of objective reasoning and fair judgment, but they usually re
main too filled with self-love to live up to this ideal and will seek shortcuts where
they can. As a result, many individuals will merely dress up their claims and pref
erences in the formal language of law in the hope that this will allow their cause to
look better than it actually is. The presence of so many poseurs in the system natu
rally leads the public to suspect that the judicial process is subject to instrumental
manipulation. Yet even though such suspicions chip away at judicial legitimacy,
they also point to the very mechanism that attracts people to judicial dispute man
agement. It is the possibility of hypocrisy that at once threatens public support for
the judiciary and makes the courts appealing.

Id
51. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon I (20 I 0).
52. 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 ( 1976) (providing that government's interest in providing the
electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is
spent by the candidate deters actual corruption and avoids the appearance of corruption by
exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity. Moreover, corruption
deterrence is of sufficient magnitude to justify intrusion on First Amendment rights resulting
from Federal Election Campaign Act's disclosure and reporting requirements).
53. /d. at 6-7, 9, 11-14.
54. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (providing that under Buckley, "the Govern
ment may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity. No
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for
profit corporations").
55. /d.at913.
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ment protected such "speech."56 Third, it held that the relevant and compel
ling interest was '"in preventing corruption and the appearance of corrup
tion. "'57 Fourth, it held that the prevention of corruption as a compelling
interest is somewhat lesser in the campaign expenditure arena than in the
campaign contribution area. 58 Fifth, it held that independent expenditures by
third parties lack the "prearrangement and coordination" of campaign con
tributions. 59 Lastly, it held that restrictions on this funding as speech need to
be narrowly tailored to serve that governmental interest in preventing cor
ruption.60
This last finding, the need to narrowly tailor a restriction on Free
Speech when that speech is financial and when the compelling government
interest is preventing electoral corruption, is itself initially puzzling. After
all, it does seem to allow for the acceptance that something less than official
"corruption," such as "favoritism" or "influence," is acceptable as an initial
matter. That was reaffirmed by the following in Citizens United, where the
Court citing McConnell with approval stated:
Favoritism and influence are not ... avoidable in representative politics. It is in the
nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary cor
ollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those policies. It is well
understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a
vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is that the candi
date will respond by producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.
Democracy is premised on responsiveness. 61

56. /d. at 898 ("The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use infor
mation to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary
means to protect it. The First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to
speech uttered during a campaign for political office."' (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (citations omitted))).
57. /d. at 908 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45). "The corporate independent ex
penditures at issue in this case, however, would not interfere with governmental functions, so
these cases are inapposite." /d. at 899.
58. /d. at 901-02 ("The Buckley Court explained that the potential for quid pro quo
corruption distinguished direct contributions to candidates from independent expenditures.
The Court emphasized that 'the independent expenditure ceiling ... fails to serve any sub
stantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the
electoral process,' ... because '[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination ... allevi
ates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments
from the candidate."') (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-48).
59. !d. at 902.
60. !d. at 898 ("[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it,
whether by design or inadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are 'subject to strict
scrutiny,' which requires the Government to prove that the restriction 'furthers a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest."' (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449,464 (2007))).
61. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003), overruled by
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
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"Democracy is premised on responsiveness."62 That is a powerful
statement, but it begs the question, is responsiveness consonant with jus
tice? On that, the Court is silent. Their reasoning, however, suggests that
they are less concerned with the risks of corruptive spending as speech in
accordance with a majoritarian view of elected governance:
The appearance of influence or access ... will not cause the electorate to lose faith
in our democracy.... The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing
to spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ul
timate influence over elected officials. 63

As discussed above in Section LA., the incompatibility of the majori
tarian view with the judicial function has more than one valid and frequent
ly articulated set of failings. In fact, the American Bar Association, flawed
organization though itself may be, is clear in its opposition to judicial elec
tions as a matter of course. 64 They have noted, "If we were writing on a
clean slate, based on what we now see in how judicial campaigns have
come to be conducted . . . judicial elections would gradually be aban
doned."65
The fact that there is a risk of corruption in permitting this kind of
speech in the electoral process is accepted. 66 The Court simply does not find
it sufficient to support the type of restrictions that were struck down. 67 As
62. !d.
63. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at910.
64. ALFRED P. CARLTON, JR., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY v-vi (2003), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/contentldam/aba!migrated/committees/judind/PublicDocuments/
report.authcheckdam.pdf ("The preferred system of state court judicial selection is a com
mission-based appointive system, with the following components: [I] The governor should
appoint judges from a pool ofjudicial aspirants whose qualifications have been reviewed and
approved by a credible, neutral, nonpartisan, diverse deliberative body or commission. [2]
Judicial appointees should serve until a specified age. Judges so appointed should not be
subject to reselection processes, and should be entitled to retirement benefits upon comple
tion ofjudicial service. [3] Judges should not otherwise be subject to reselection, nonetheless
remain subject to regular judicial perfonnance evaluations and disciplinary processes that
include removal for misconduct.").
65. !d. at xii ("But we write not on the clean slate but in recognition of the varied
approaches of the citizens of the 50 states through their Constitutions have dealt and continue
to deal with the conundrum ofjudicial selection. We offer recommendations as to changes in
various existing election methodologies and urge that efforts to improve how judicial elec
tions are conducted must continue, such as the trend to nonpartisan campaigns and the use of
public financing mechanisms, in the face of difficulties to eliminate the use of judicial elec
tions. Any selection system should be accompanied by a sound code of judicial ethics ac
companied by effective, enforced judicial disciplinary procedures."); Jill E. Moenius, Note,
Buying Promises: How Citizens United's Campaign Expenditures Convert Our "Impartial"

Judges and Their Nonpromissory Campaign Statements into an Indebted, Influenced, and
Dependent Judiciary, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 1101, 1106 (2011).
66. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (because there is no quid pro quo).
67. Id.
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they stated, "Reliance on a 'generic favoritism or influence theory ... is at
odds with standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and
susceptible to no limiting principle. '"68 As we will see in the next Part, how
ever, empirical evidence studying campaign contributions suggests that par
tisan elections themselves may be the source of financial speech's corrup
tive influence.
II. THE POWER OF MONEY
"What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be
done; and there is nothing new under the sun. "
Ecclesiastes 1:9

A. Campaign Contributions Affect Judicial Action
The fact that judges are subject to a certain amount of influence aris
ing from the manner by which they reach the bench is intuitively obvious.
As early as the 1853 Massachusetts State Constitutional Convention, "one
delegate said of judges: 'They are men, and they are influenced by the
communities, the societies and the classes in which they live, and the ques
tion now is, not whether they shall be influenced at all, . . . but from what
quarter that influence shall come. "'69
It bas long been accepted that we can no more completely remove the
human bias of experience from a judge than we can from any other person?0
68. !d. at 910 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 296
(2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876) ("The appearance of influence or ac
cess, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition,
an independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordi
nated with a candidate. The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend
money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence over
elected officials. This is inconsistent with any suggestion that the electorate will refuse 'to
take part in democratic governance' because of additional political speech made by a corpo
ration or any other speaker." (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 296 (citations omitted))).
69. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An
Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
69, 77 (2011) (quoting OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE
CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, To REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETIS 773 (1853) (statement of Edward L. Keyes)).
70. Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 107, 111
(201 0) ("This distinction between viewing judges as subconsciously motivated by cultural
preferences rather than by prejudicial partisan or legal objectives is a crucial one. First, if the
form of bias in judicial decisionmaking is not properly understood, the judging function is
unnecessarily delegitimized as being merely a partisan or nonnative exercise. Second, alt
hough it is impossible to rid judicial decisions of all remnants of bias because of the manner
in which human cognition operates, social science and legal research indicate that debiasing
techniques do exist for judges to counteract their susceptibility to the more troubling and
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We are all reflections of our own experience and despite what is a consider
able effort by legal educators of ethics to move towards a decrease in un
conscious bias among lawyers, no judge can completely be made into a tru
ly impartial entity. 71 Nor, truly, do we want them to. 72 Some aspect of hu
manity is expected of the judiciary, to be used within the discretion of wis
dom and experience, lest we simply replace the legal system with a comput
er-run justice algorithm and have done with humanity at all. 73
The fact that humanity is imperfect is not sufficient to end the use of
humans in the justice system. The question that must now urgently be an
swered is simply at what levels of directness do we wish to allow campaign
contributions to be a source of influence on judicial decisions. A corollary
to that inquiry is whether we consider the remedies of the judicial regulatory
system sufficient to combat the effects of this influence.
If we accept as a first principle that campaign contributions, direct or
indirect, affect the behavior of the elected, then we encounter a normative
question of where that influence is appropriate if it is inescapable. The Citi
zen's United decision stands for the principle that restricting the abilities of
corporate actors to fund advertisements beyond the campaign's own control
is permissible. 74 Thus, whatever effect advertising has on election results

illiberal aspects of their biased decisionmaking. "); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323
( 1987) ("[T]he theory of cognitive psychology states that the culture-including, for exam
ple, the media and an individual's parents, peers, and authority figures-transmits certain
beliefs and preferences. Because these beliefs are so much a part of the culture, they are not
experienced as explicit lessons. Instead, they seem part of the individual's rational ordering
of her perceptions of the world.").
71. Secunda, supra note 70, at 144 ("This persistent state of affairs only means that
judges will have to work harder to craft their decisions with appropriate humility and self
awareness.").
72. Theodore A. McKee, Judges As Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709, 1724
(2007) ("I am troubled by the fact that our jurisprudence is shaped by personal beliefs, but I
am more troubled by pretending that judges can somehow become perfect objective adjudi
cators at the flip of a switch, or the wearing of a robe.").
73. !d. at 1716-17 ("From the judicial perspective, the vast majority of these cases
are fairly clear cut, relatively easy to resolve, and usually involve none of today's hot-button
issues where personal values may have a greater tendency to affect one's jurisprudence....
Moreover, even when cases do involve 'vexing issues of constitutional interpretation' the
facts and law are often so clear that there is little room for a judge's personal view to impact
his or her decision. However, I think we should candidly admit that there are other instances
where there is enough play in the factual or precedential joints to allow personal beliefs to
affect our adjudication. I do not say that this is a good thing, but I do believe it is unavoida
ble, and that our jurisprudence will be strengthened by admitting this dynamic rather than
denying its existence." (quoting Seth Rosenthal, The Jury Snub: A Conservative Form of
Judicial Activism, SLATE, Dec. 18, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2155723)).
74. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908-09 (2010).
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will likely be magnified. 75 While that has its own dangers in the other
branches of government, the question of the effect of such advertising in
judicial elections requires an assessment of whether the amplified effect is
cause for even greater concern in judicial decision making.
As a threshold matter it thus becomes necessary to inquire if the judge
is susceptible to the influence of campaign donors or campaign expenditures
in actual judicial decisions. Intuition would suggest that such influence ex
ists, but faith in judicial training would suggest that on the bench, such in
fluence would be disregarded in the active role behavior of the judge. After
all, judges are all subject to the various Canons that stress such requirements
as impartiality and lack of bias. 76
Empirical evidence, however, shows that the Canons are not sufficient
in the direct campaign contributions context. 77 In a remarkable recent arti
cle, Michael Kang and Joanna Shepherd of Emory University sought to
answer the critical inquiry underpinning the legitimacy of the judicial elec
tion model; does the money matterT8 They framed their inquiry thusly: "To
what degree is financing for judicial campaigns associated with judicial
decisions favorable to the interests of the sources of that campaign financ
ing? To put it more bluntly, to what extent does money buy judicial deci
sions, at least where judges rely on campaign contributions to get elect
ed?"79
Their dataset included "detailed information on virtually every state
supreme court case in all fifty states between 1995 and 1998[,] ... more
than 28,000 cases, involving more than 470 judges."80 Specifically, they
focused on campaign contributions from business groups, routinely the sin
gle largest contributors in state Supreme Court races. 81 The results were
"provocative." 82 They found that "campaign contributions from business
groups" were positively associated with "judicial votes in favor of business
interests. " 83
Moreover, "every dollar of contributions from business groups is as
sociated with increases in the probability that elected judges will decide for
75. Melody Kramer, 'Citizens United' Ruling Opened Floodgates on Groups' Ad
Spending, NPR (Oct. 7, 20 I 0) http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/20 10/10/07/13039
9554/fresh-air.
76. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1-4 (2010).
77. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians:
The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 290, 293-96 (2010) (finding that appointed judges write higher quality opin
ions, whereas elected judges write more opinions~focusing on service to voters).
78. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 69, at 69.
79. /d. at 71.
80. /d. at 72.
81. /d. at 73.
82. /d.
83. /d.
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business litigants."84 This result was statistically significant only under par
tisan election schemes, but not under non-partisan ones. 85 This is a hopeful
fact we will reprise later in Section II.C. 86
Interestingly, the relation was evident in judges affiliated with either
major political party. The study found, "[c]ampaign contributions are pre
dictive of judicial voting in partisan system, regardless of the judges' party
affiliations."87 Simply, "both Republican and Democratic judges facing par
tisan elections are more likely to decide for business litigants than judges in
other systems." 88
While other empirical research is obviously necessary and we can
hope further significant study may mitigate the seemingly inescapable in
dictment of the partisan judicial electoral system, the current findings are
damning. Again, these studies were done on elections held before Citizens
United and only looked at direct campaign contributions. Studies on the
effect of advertising are clearly needed. As the Court noted in Citizens Unit
ed, "there is only scant evidence that independent expenditures even ingrati
ate" the elected and that "[i]ngratiation and access, in any event, are not
corruption."89 To the extent that money does matter in judicial voting as
described by Kang and Shepherd, there is little reason to hope that no level
of ingratiation or access is accomplished in response to the advertising cam
paign.90 This is likely even more true as the costs of judicial campaigns con
tinue to escalate.
B. The Remedy of Recusal? A Due Process Concern

"The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by neces
sity. "91
Aristotle (384 BC- 322 BC)
All those who appear in court, be they litigants or criminal defendants,
are entitled to an unbiased judge. 92 They are entitled to a fair trial. 93 This is

84. /d.
85. /d.
86. See infra Section II.C.
87. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 69, at 75.
88. /d.
89. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010).
90. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 69, at 94 ("[S]everal empirical studies have found
that the significant differences in competitiveness and spending across election types produce
different voting behaviors among judges. For example, studies have shown that judges sub
ject to nonpartisan and partisan reelection are more likely to avoid unpopular voting on polit
ically salient issues and impose the death penalty.").
91. POLITICS, ARISTOTLE (350 B.C.E.), available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/
politics.2.two.html.
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not simply a compelling government interest. It is the Due Process right of
the litigant, and it is axiomatic to our system of laws. 94 It is also unchal
lenged by the Court in Citizens United. 95
That the Due Process right to a fair trial and an unbiased judge can be
abridged through the medium of disproportionate influence via campaign
expenditures also went unchallenged by the Citizens United Court. 96 The
remedy for such violation, according to the Court, was not, however, to ban
the "litigant's political speech"-campaign expenditures. 97 Rather, in such
instances the remedy is simply the judge's recusal. 98
The case standing for that proposition (judicial recusal) is the notori
ous Caperton v. A. T Massey Coal Co., 99 whose holding was affirmed but
distinguished in Citizens United. 100 In Caperton, the trial jury had found the
defendant, Massey, liable for $50 million in compensatory and punitive
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, and tortious inter
ference with contract relations. 101 Massey appealed. 102
In the intervening time, the Supreme Court of Appeals in West Virgin
ia held its elections. 103 Massey's chairman, Don Blankenship, knowing that
the Supreme Court of Appeals would soon be determining the $50 million
appeal, chose to support Brent Benjamin's campaign for that bench. 104
Blankenship complied with the limit on direct contributions to Benjamin's

92. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) ("It is axiomat
ic that '[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."' (quoting In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))).
93. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
94. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (I 975) ("Concededly, a 'fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."' (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136)); see
Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due pro
cess. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our sys
tem of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end
no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an
interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and
relationships must be considered.").
95. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876,910 (2010).
96. /d. ("The McConnell record was 'over 100,000 pages' long, ... yet it 'does not
have any direct examples of votes being exchanged for ... expenditures.'... This confirms
Buckley's reasoning that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance
of, quid pro quo corruption. In fact, there is only scant evidence that independent expendi
tures even ingratiate." (citations omitted)).
97. Id.
98. /d.
99. 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256-58 (2009).
I 00. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
101. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
I 02. Id. at 2257-58.
103. /d. at 2257.
104. /d.
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campaign, donating only the maximum allowed $1,000. 105 He would, how
ever, go on to spend $500,000 in independent expenditures, including tele
vision and newspaper advertisements as well as donating an additional $2.5
million to a political organization targeting Benjamin's opponent. 106
After Benjamin won the judicial election, Caperton moved to disquali
fy Justice Benjamin because of the conflict caused by Blankenship's cam
paign involvement. 107 Justice Benjamin denied the motion and later, along
with the minimum number of additional judges required to form the majori
ty, reversed the jury verdict against Massey. 108
Eventually, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to de
termine if Caperton's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights were vio
lated by Justice Benjamin's refusal to recuse himself from the Caperton
appeal, given the level of Blankenship's support of his electoral cam
paign. 109 The Court held recusal had been required under those circumstanc
es. 110 Particularly, the Court stated that an elected judge must recuse himself
"when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant
and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising
funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending
or imminent." 111
Importantly, the vast majority of Blankenship's money went towards
campaign expenditures, rather than direct campaign contributions. 112 Yet,
the Court found that, given the totality of the circumstances, "Blankenship's
campaign contributions ... had a ... disproportionate influence on the elec
toral outcome. " 113 Since only $1,000 of the nearly $3 million spent by
Blankenship actually went directly to Benjamin's campaign, the Court
clearly articulated in this case that campaign expenditures have the ability to
influence elected behavior much in the same way as direct campaign contri
butions, at least for the purpose of Due Process evaluation. 114
105. !d.
106. !d.
I 07. !d.
I 08. !d. at 2257-58.
I 09. !d. at 2256-57, 2259.
II 0. !d. at 2264.
Ill. /d. at 2263-64.
112. !d. at 2257 ("Blankenship donated almost $2.5 million to 'And For The Sake Of
The Kids,' a political organization ... [and] in addition, just over $500,000 on independent
expenditures-for direct mailings and letters soliciting donations as well as television and
newspaper advertisements.").
113. /d. at 2264.
114. !d. at 2257, 2264-65 ("We find that Blankenship's significant and disproportion
ate influence-coupled with the temporal relationship between the election and the pending
case-'offer a possible temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true."' (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825
(1986) (citations omitted))).
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Moreover, the standard requiring Benjamin's recusal was simply that
of a substantial risk of actual bias, rather than the much stricter requirement
"that independent expenditures ... lead to, or create the appearance of, quid
pro quo corruption" required to support a categorical ban on corporate polit
ical speech. 115 As the Court stated in Citizens United, "Caperton's holding
was limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant's
political speech could be banned. " 116
The Court in Caperton, however, did note that determining when
campaign expenditures would be sufficient to require the judge's recusal
would be extraordinarily difficult in the usual course. 117 Moreover, it is like
ly rare that the actual chairman of the defendant in a case being appealed
would take so direct and blatant a position in the funding of a potential ju
rist's campaign.
When the donor of disproportionately large campaign expenditures
has a clear personal stake in the pending appeal, the remedy of requiring
recusal is apparent and relatively easy to apply. If the donor does not have a
"personal stake," is the risk of actual bias, however, necessarily lessened?
Not if the findings of Kang and Shepherd are to be believed. 118 That study
clearly stands for the proposition that classes of campaign donors can actu
ally influence the ruling of judges (both Democrat and Republican) on be
half of classes of litigants (donors)Y 9 While impossible to prove without
additional research, there is no reason to believe that further study would
not likewise find that classes of campaign expenditure donors would actual
ly influence the ruling of judges in favor of those classes of litigants. Yet,
there is currently no remedy, not even that ofrecusal, that could be applied
to protect those litigants' Due Process right to a fair trial.
All recusal standards are risk-based approaches. They tend to support
the recusal of the judge on due process grounds if the risk is sufficiently
substantial. 120 It is no surprise, therefore, that as the amount of money being
115. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010). Due
process requires "whether, 'under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and hu
man weakness,' the interest 'poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice
must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented."' Caper
ton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). However,
"[s]tates may choose to 'adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires."'
!d. at 2267 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. V. White, 536 U.S. 765,794 (2002) (Kenne
dy, J., concurring)).
116. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910.
117. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 ("The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias, and
the fact that the inquiry is often a private one, simply underscore the need for objective rules.
Otherwise there may be no adequate protection against a judge who simply misreads or
misapprehends the real motives at work in deciding the case.").
118. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 69, at 128-29.
119. !d.
120. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
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spent on judicial elections increases, so too does the public's perception that
the risk of a biased judge increases in tandem.
C. Communities Negatively Perceive the Effect of Contributions on Judicial
Elections
There is a very interesting dichotomy on the public's opinion of judi
cial elections. When surveyed, the public often expresses its firm belief that
elected judges are "more likely to be fair and impartial." 121 One national
survey found that 75% of the public believed elected judges were more im
partial while only 18% chose appointed, and in another survey 76% favored
judicial elections to only 20% for judicial appointments. 122
Yet, when Chief Justice Moyer of the Ohio Supreme Court established
the Citizens Committee on Judicial Elections in order to review Ohio's judi
cial election system, 123 the Committee shockingly found that nine out of ten
Ohioans believed that judges are affected by political contributions and that
they question the impartiality ofjudges towards campaign contributors. 124
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appointed a Special
Commission to determine whether the state of judicial elections across the
state diminished the public's perception of the judiciary . 125 After several
public hearings, polls, and meetings with interested parties, the Special
Commission concluded that: 88% of Pennsylvanians believed that judges'
decisions were influenced, at least some of the time, by campaign contribu
tions; 75% believed that those who can afford large contributions have more

121. Ruth V. McGregor, Rule of Law in Challenging Times, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 549, 553 (2009); see J. Christopher Heagarty, Public Opinion and an Elected Judici
ary: New Avenues for Reform, 39 WILLAMETIE L. REv. 1287, 1292 (2003).
122. Heagarty, supra note 121, at 1300.
123. Richard B. McQuade, Report of the Citizens' Committee on Judicial Elections
(1995), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh!pages/frontline/shows/justice/que/studies.
html#oh (last visited June 5, 2011).
124. !d. (providing the Committee's proposal that there must be the following: a limit
to campaign contribution of $500 from individuals and $2,500 from organizations ($5,000
for Supreme Court candidates); candidates' speech must be limited; recusal for judges in
cases where attorneys or parties made a significant campaign contribution; limitations on
contribution periods; and increased disclosure requirements (identification of each donor and
full disclosure twenty days before an election). The Committee set out its responsibility with
the assumptions that a majority of the committee would not be comprised of lawyers and
that, unlike other politicians, judges are held to a higher standard. The report was based on
work performed from several hearings, commissioned public opinion polls, and, meetings
with experts and interested parties).
125. LAKE, SOSIN, SNELL, PERRY & ASSOCS., INC., PENNSYLVANIA SPECIAL
COMMISSION TO LIMIT CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES 4, 6 (1998), available at
http://www. pacourts. us/NR/rdonlyres/7 5F3607E-BOB4-4B9B-95 5463B281279EC6/0/appenda.pdf.
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influence in electing judges; and, Pennsylvanians are more anxious about
the judiciary than about other elected offices. 126
This divergence in opinion could well be summed up with the view
that the public thinks that elected judges are more independent than ap
pointed ones, except when it comes to their contributors. It suggests the
public perceives and the empirical evidence supports that the judges stay
bought. The corollary is that the public appears to believe that those ap
pointed are corrupt or at least biased by the political appointment system
itself, despite the lack of any supporting evidence. Since the appointment
process is beyond the public's control or understanding, there is a general
mistrust of it and those that profit from it, namely, the judges themselves.
Also, it is possible that the simple availability of having elections comforts
the public; in the sense they believe that corrective action is possible.
It is likely impossible to create a system where the public feels that the
judiciary is truly impartial and fair as both options generally require that
political parties be involved in the selection process in some way. The evi
dence from the Kang article that the correlation in rulings to judicial action
disappears in non-partisan elections suggests that the public may, in fact, be
intuitively correct at some level. It is the presence of party officers or offi
cials that is the actual problematic source of bias.
CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court previously recognized in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White that there exists a "'fundamental tension between the
ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of electoral poli
tics. "' 127 Despite this, last year's Supreme Court reached a provocative deci
sian in Citizens United, allowing for a remarkable expansion in funding
avenues for political speech.
Citizens United was the product of a "decades-long legal drive" to re
think limitations on political speech doctrine. Much of the original inspira
tion drew "from the 1971 memo drafted by soon-to-be Justice Lewis Powell
that urged corporate leaders to fund scholars and public interest legal groups
to promote a 'free market' approach in the courts." 128 Former Federal Elec
tion Commission chair Bradley Smith bragged to the New York Times that

126. See id. at 7.
127. 536 U.S. 765, 821 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer,
501 U.S. 380,400 (1991)).
128. Money, Politics, and the Constitution: Beyond Citizens United, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUSTICE (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/money
_politics_and_the_constitution_beyond_citizens_united.
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Citizens United was the fruit of "long-term ideological warfare." 129 This
effort was bold, strategic, and willing to rethink basic premises. It has been
markedly effective. Above all, it sought to advance a powerful but narrow
notion of the First Amendment, focused on the rights of the speaker, espe
cially corporate speakers.
The potential impact of this decision on judicial elections has not gone
without notice. As one author wrote, the potential for such advertising to
further corrode the public faith in the judiciary is clear:
While corporate and union big money may or may not be ideal for elections of leg
islative and executive offices, it poses even greater risk for judicial elections. In his
dissent, Justice Stevens cites the Justice At Stake amicus brief, joined by AJS. He
writes "'the majority of the States select their judges through popular elections. At
a time when concerns about the conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever
pitch, the Court today unleashes the floodgates of corporate and union general
treasury spending in these races."' More money injected into judicial races threat
ens to undermine both the actual and perceived impartiality of the judiciary. 130

Thus, the question becomes simply, if we acknowledge that increased
advertising spending in judicial elections will only increase the public per
ception of bias by the judiciary, how can we allow judicial selection by
election? The answer is that we cannot. The role of the judge requires im
partiality and our system of laws requires lack of partisanship in judicial
decision-making. The answer seems to be fundamentally clear, neither cam
paign finance laws nor the self-regulation of the judiciary can restrain the
impartial judge from acting like the politician. In a system allowing for no
restraint on speech, the only option is silence.

129. Eric Lichtblau, Long Battle by Foes of Campaign Finance Rules Shifts Land
scape, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/I0/16/us/politics/
16donate.htrnl?_r= I &ref=politics.
130. Cynthia Gray, Top Judicial Ethics Stories of 2010, 93 JUDICATURE 187, 190
(2011 ).

